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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In February we celebrated 100 years of our income tax.1  I don’t know if 
celebrated is the right word.  Our leaders in Washington just voted to 
continue the Bush tax cuts for all but the highest income wage earners.2  But 
if you think the fiscal cliff deal was a good thing for the middle class—as 
President Obama promised3—think again.  The extension of the Bush tax 
cuts does nothing to change the fact that most middle- and low-income wage 
earners do not benefit from the tax breaks, loopholes, and deductions that 
 *  Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law, B.S. Fordham University; J.D., 
Georgetown University Law Center; L.L.M. (Taxation), New York University.  I would like to thank 
the participants at the Tax Advice for the Second Obama Administration Symposium for helpful 
comments, especially Bruce Bartlett and David Miller.  This article is part of Pepperdine Law 
Review’s January 18, 2013 Tax Advice for the Second Obama Administration symposium, co-
sponsored by Tax Analysts. 
1.  The Sixteenth Amendment was ratified on February 3, 1913.  Charters of Freedom:
Constitution of the United States, Amendments 11–27, NAT. ARCHIVES,
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_amendments_11-27.html (last visited Mar. 
25, 2013). 
2.  American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, 126 Stat. 2313 (2013), 
available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr8/text. 
 3.  See Stephanie Condon, “Fiscal Cliff” Averted After Deal Clears House, CBS NEWS, Jan. 1, 
2013, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-250_162-57561534/fiscal-cliff-averted-after-deal-clears-
house/. 
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Congress preserved for the richest Americans.4  Warren Buffett will still pay 
a lower effective tax rate than his secretary.5 
The recent elections showed that race matters,6 but guess which 
taxpayers stand to lose most from the fiscal cliff deal?: taxpayers of color.7  
Ignored in the discussion was whether a continuation of current law would 
be good for taxpayers based upon their race and/or ethnicity.  Current law 
reflects congressional choices about whether income will be taxed and at 
what rate, and whether something just paid for is deductible.  This Essay8 
shows that most taxpayers of color and most whites do not get the benefit of 
those congressional choices.  
The price that most of us pay for the deductions, loopholes, and special 
deals received by a small, high-income slice of mainly white Americans is 
higher tax rates.9  Plus, two-thirds of Americans do not itemize their 
 4.  See generally Alice Gresham Bullock, The Tax Code, the Tax Gap, and Income Inequality: 
The Middle Class Squeeze, 53 HOW. L.J. 249 (2010) (discussing the ways in which the Bush tax cuts 
impact the rich as well as the middle and lower classes). 
 5.  See, e.g., Seniboye Tienabeso, Warren Buffett and His Secretary Talk Taxes, ABCNEWS, 
Jan. 25, 2012, http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/business/2012/01/warren-buffett-and-his-secretary-talk-
taxes/. 
6. See, e.g., Allison Kopicki & Will Irving, Assessing How Pivotal the Hispanic Vote Was to 
Obama’s Victory, N.Y. TIMES BLOG (Nov. 20, 2012, 4:16 PM), 
http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/20/assessing-how-pivotal-the-hispanic-vote-was-to-
obamas-victory/; Latino Voters Showing Strong Turnout in Election 2012, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 
2012, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-11-06/politics/35505575_1_latino-voters-hispanic-
voter-turnout-mi-familia-vota; Adam C. Smith, Hispanic Voters Hold Key to 2012 Electoral College 
Map, POLITICO, May 6, 2012, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0512/75949.html. 
 7.  See infra Parts II, III, and IV. 
8.  This Essay follows up on my previous scholarship that has looked at the race and class 
impact of several Internal Revenue Code provisions.  See, e.g., Dorothy A. Brown, Implicit Bias and 
the Earned Income Tax Credit, in IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW 164 (Justin D. Levinson 
& Robert J. Smith eds., 2012) [hereinafter Brown, Implicit Bias]; Dorothy A. Brown, Teaching Civil 
Rights Through the Basic Tax Course, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 809 (2010) [hereinafter Brown, Teaching
Civil Rights]; Dorothy A. Brown, Shades of the American Dream, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 329 (2009) 
[hereinafter Brown, Shades] (tax subsidies for housing); Dorothy A. Brown, Race and Class Matters 
in Tax Policy, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 790 (2007) [hereinafter Brown, Race and Class] (earned income 
tax credit); Dorothy A. Brown, Pensions and Risk Aversion: The Influence of Race, Ethnicity, and 
Class on Investor Behavior, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 385 (2007) [hereinafter Brown, Risk
Aversion] (employer-provided pensions); Dorothy A. Brown, The Tax Treatment of Children: 
Separate but Unequal, 54 EMORY L.J. 755 (2005) [hereinafter Brown, Separate but Unequal]
(comparing the earned income tax credit and the child tax credit); Dorothy A. Brown, Pensions,
Risk, and Race, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1501 (2004) [hereinafter Brown, Risk and Race]
(employer-provided pensions); Dorothy A. Brown, Social Security and Marriage in Black and 
White, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 111 (2004) (marriage penalty/bonus in the social security system); Dorothy 
A. Brown, Race, Class, and Gender Essentialism in Tax Literature: The Joint Return, 54 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1469 (1997) [hereinafter Brown, Joint Return]; Dorothy A. Brown, The Marriage 
Bonus/Penalty in Black and White, in TAXING AMERICA 45 (Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise 
Fellows eds., 1996) [hereinafter Brown, Marriage Bonus/Penalty] (joint return). 
9.  Cf. Shartia Brantley, Who Are the Black “1 Percent”?, GRIO (Nov. 21, 2011, 9:38 AM), 
http://thegrio.com/2011/11/21/who-are-the-black-1-percent/. 
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deductions and therefore get no tax advantage from most of the choices 
Congress makes when it comes to deductions.10  If deductions and special 
deals were eliminated, tax rates could be cut by as much as ten percentage 
points for all but the lowest income wage earners.11  That would mean a 
simpler and fairer tax code for all.  It would also mean that the highest 
income households would pay a great deal more in taxes.  Ours would then 
be a true progressive tax system.   
Most Americans lose under the current system, yet the system 
continues.  What would it take for change to occur?  Have the highest 
income Americans so “influenced” Congress with their campaign 
contributions that Congress mindlessly does their bidding?  I believe the 
explanation is more complicated than that.  I argue that the people who 
benefit most from our current tax policies are members of Congress. 
I suspect that members of Congress are disproportionate beneficiaries of 
the choices they enact into law.12  I don’t know this for a fact, because 
members of Congress are not required by law to release their tax returns and 
very few do.13  Therefore, the first step toward meaningful tax reform will be 
for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to issue a report on the 535 tax 
returns of every member of Congress. 
Bold reform that eliminates loopholes, deductions, and special deals as a 
means of lowering tax rates in general would help the majority of 
taxpayers—white and nonwhite alike.  A blueprint for such reform already 
exists.  Due to space constraints, this Essay considers only three of the 
Blacks comprise 13.6% of the U.S. population according to the 2010 Census, but account 
for only 1.4% of the top 1% of households by income.  Whites are the overwhelming 
majority of the top 1% of households by income, comprising 96.2%.  (Results were 
calculated from 2007 data from the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances and 
the Tax Policy Center’s tax table[.]  The income cutoff to be a part of the top 1% was 
$646,195. 
Id.
 10.  Dorothy Brown, Let’s Kill the Progressive Tax Rate System, CNN OPINION (Apr. 17, 2012, 
7:43 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/04/17/opinion/brown-progressive-tax-rates. 
11. Cf. ALAN SIMPSON & ERSKINE BOWLES, THE MOMENT OF TRUTH: REPORT OF THE 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY AND REFORM 29 (2010), available at
http://www.fiscalcommission.gov/sites/fiscalcommission.gov/files/documents/TheMomentofTruth1
2_1_2010.pdf.
 12.  See Dorothy A. Brown, Harry Reid Has a Glass House Quandry on Taxes, Bloomberg View, 
Sept. 16, 2012, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-16/harry-reid-has-a-glass-
house-quandary-on-taxes.html. 
13.  Stephanie Condon, Few in Congress Have Released Tax Returns, Report Shows, CBS
NEWS, July 19, 2012, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-57475567-503544/few-in-
congress-have-released-tax-returns-report-shows/.
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largest tax expenditures.14  In December 2010, the bi-partisan National 
Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform (Simpson–Bowles) issued 
a report showing how tax rates could be cut by roughly ten percentage points 
for all but the lowest income bracket if (1) taxable income were viewed 
more broadly, (2) there was no preferential rate for capital gains, and (3) 
deductions were significantly modified or eliminated.15  However, one tax 
break I would retain is the earned income tax credit (EITC), which lifts 
millions of Americans and children out of poverty.16  Meaningful reform 
would require Congress to stop making choices that favor their wallets over 
the wallets of most Americans. 
Part II of this Essay considers the tax exclusion from gross income for 
employer or union-provided pensions.17  The estimated revenue loss in 2013 
from those wages and earnings not currently being taxed is projected to be 
$147 billion.18  The data for private sector workers show that most Asian-
Americans, blacks, Latinos, and whites do not receive this benefit.19  
According to the Employee Benefits Research Institute, less than four in ten 
black workers, less than four in ten Asian-American workers, and just over 
two in ten Latino workers participate in their private sector pension plans 
and are eligible for this benefit.20  Just over four in ten white workers were 
eligible for this benefit.21  Thus, most workers do not benefit from this tax 
break.22  Part II goes further than Simpson–Bowles by arguing for the repeal 
of this exclusion.23  Wages placed in employer-provided pensions should be 
included in the employee’s gross income when earned and should be 
currently taxed.24 
Part III considers the congressional decision to tax income from stock at 
a preferential rate compared to that applied to wages.25  Less than one in ten 
14. While this Essay considers three examples, I am currently writing a book on this topic that 
will include additional examples and a more in-depth analysis. 
15. See SIMPSON & BOWLES, supra note 11. 
16.  I have written previously on the EITC.  See, e.g., Brown, Separate but Unequal, supra note 
8; Brown, Race and Class, supra note 8.  See also Francine Lipman’s contribution to this 
symposium detailing the importance of the EITC to reducing childhood poverty. 
 17.  See infra Part II. 
18.  J. COMM. ON TAX’N, JCS-1-12, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL
YEARS 2011–2015 42 (2012), available at https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown 
&id=4386.
 19.  See infra Part II. 
20.  Craig Copeland, Employment-Based Retirement Plan Participation: Geographic Differences 
and Trends, 2010, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF, Oct. 2011, at 1, 9, 11, 30, available at
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_10-2011_No363_Ret_Part.pdf. 
21. Id.
 22.  See id. 
 23.  See infra Part II. 
 24.  See infra Part II. 
 25.  See infra Part III. 
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Americans of color own stock in a way that makes them eligible for the low 
preferential rate.26  Less than two in ten white Americans own stock in a way 
that makes them eligible for the preferential rate.27  This tax break is 
projected to cost $110 billion in lost revenue this year.28  In 2012, 71% of 
capital gains and corporate dividends went to the top one percent of 
American households.29  The majority of Americans never pay the low 
preferential rate associated with stock ownership.30  Simpson–Bowles shows 
that marginal tax rates can be lowest if income from stock is taxed at the 
same rate as income from wages.31  Part III concludes by arguing that all 
income should be subject to the same tax rates.32 
 Part IV considers the congressional decision to allow a tax deduction for 
mortgage interest.33  For 2013, the estimated revenue loss caused by this 
deduction is expected to be almost $90 billion.34  By comparison, the entire 
budget for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development is less 
than $50 billion.35  The majority of blacks and Latinos are not homeowners 
and are therefore not eligible for the mortgage interest deduction.36  Though 
the majority of whites and Asian-Americans are homeowners, the majority 
of all Americans, regardless of race, never receive the benefit of this 
26.  Jesse Bricker et al., Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2007 to 2010: Evidence from the 
Survey of Consumer Finances, 98 FED. RES. BULL. 1, 29 (2012), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2012/pdf/scf12.pdf. 
27. Id.
28.  J. COMM. ON TAX’N, supra note 18, at 37. 
29.  Chye-Ching Huang & Chuck Marr, Raising Today’s Low Capital Gains Tax Rates Could 
Promote Economic Efficiency and Fairness, While Helping Reduce Deficits, CENTER ON BUDGET &
POL’Y PRIORITIES, Sept. 19, 2012, at 2, available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/9-19-12tax.pdf 
(“Capital gains are heavily concentrated at the top; the top 1 percent of taxpayers will receive 71
percent of all capital gains in 2012 . . . .”).  Beginning in 2013, the low preferential rate for the 
highest income households is 20% plus 3.8% on net investment income under the health reform law.  
Id. at 22–23.  Note that high-income households are defined differently under the Internal Revenue 
Code with the extension of the Bush tax cuts ($400,000/$450,000) and under the Patient and 
Affordable Care Act ($200,000/$250,000/$225,000).  See, e.g., Thomas A. Humphreys et al., Fiscal
Cliff Diving a.k.a. American Taxpayer Relief Act, TAX TALK, Jan. 2013, at 2 & n.1, available at
http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/130125-MoFo-Tax-Talk.pdf. 
 30.  See id. 
 31.  See SIMPSON & BOWLES, supra note 11, at 28. 
 32.  See infra Part III. 
 33.  See infra Part IV. 
34.  J. COMM. ON TAX’N, supra note 18, at 36. 
35.  U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2013 BUDGET:
HOUSING AND COMMUNITIES BUILT TO LAST, available at http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/docu 
ments/huddoc?id=CombBudget2013.pdf. 
 36.  See infra notes 128–52 and accompanying text. 
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deduction: a recent study showed that only 29% of returns claimed a 
mortgage interest deduction.37  While Simpson–Bowles argues for 
converting the mortgage interest deduction into a credit,38 I argue for its 
repeal. 
Part V points out a possible political path toward achieving my vision of 
tax reform, which would broaden the base of taxable income while lowering 
tax rates in order to benefit the majority of Americans.39  Simpson–Bowles is 
the least we should be able to accomplish.  The recent fiscal cliff deal did 
little to change the status quo.40  If Congress passes tax laws that benefit the 
rich because the rich are the primary source of their campaign 
contributions,41 then we should never expect change.  We have a classic 
collective action problem.42 
The rich are a relatively small yet highly motivated group when 
compared with the general public—who are diffuse and not engaged.  What 
will change the dynamic will be something that political scientists call a 
“focusing event.”43  That focusing event will be the issuance of and the 
media coverage surrounding “The 535 Report.”44 
The 535 Report will be a study of congressional tax returns undertaken 
by the IRS in order to identify the tax laws utilized by each member of 
Congress.45  Because the IRS already publishes its Statistics of Income on all 
tax returns, with this study we will be able to compare the percent of 
congressional beneficiaries with the percent of ordinary Americans who 
benefit from various loopholes, special tax rates, and deductions.  I predict 
that after The 535 Report is released, the public will get angry and 
Congress—ever more concerned about retention issues and primary 
37. Id. Only a third of all returns itemized deductions, and of those returns that itemized 
deductions, over 80% claimed the mortgage interest deduction.  Adam J. Cole, Geoffrey Gee & 
Nicholas Turner, The Distributional and Revenue Consequences of Reforming the Mortgage Interest 
Deduction, 64 NAT’L TAX J. 977, 977 (2011), available at http://ntj.tax.org/wwtax/ntjrec.nsf/ 
009a9a91c225e83d852567ed006212d8/5e1815e49ceb7d318525796800526cf8/$FILE/A04_Cole.pdf
(“Of the 143 million tax returns filed for tax year 2007, 29 percent claimed the [mortgage interest 
deduction] . . .  and among the 50.5 million returns on which taxpayers itemized their deductions, 82 
percent claimed the [mortgage interest deduction].”).  This study does not analyze the 29% by race 
because I.R.S. statistics do not collect taxpayer information by race. 
 38.  See SIMPSON & BOWLES, supra note 11, at 31. 
 39.  See infra Part V. 
40. See American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, 126 Stat. 2313 (2013), 
available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr8/text. 
41. See generally Spencer Overton, The Donor Class: Campaign Finance, Democracy, and 
Participation, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 73 (2004) (discussing the intricacies of campaign finance and 
recommending campaign finance reform).
42. See Brown, Marriage Bonus/Penalty, supra note 8, at 45. 
43.  JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 94–100 (2d ed. 1995). 
 44.  See infra Part V. 
 45.  See infra Part V. 
02 BROWN SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/16/13  9:06 AM 
[Vol. 40: 1155, 2013] The 535 Report 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
1161 
challengers—will embrace tax reform that is good for most Americans, even 
if it is bad for them.46 
II.  INCOME CHOICES 
This Part discusses the exclusion for employer- or union-provided 
pension plans in the private sector.47  Current law allows wages that 
employees place in pension plans (as well as amounts contributed by 
employers) to be exempt from an employee’s current wages and not taxed. 
As the pension plans accumulate earnings, those amounts are also not taxed 
at the time they accrue.  Only when the employee makes withdrawals, 
perhaps forty years later at their retirement, will those amounts be taxed.48 
According to the Employee Benefits Research Institute, less than four in 
ten black workers, less than four in ten Asian-American workers, and just 
over two in ten Latino workers participate in their pension plans and are 
eligible for this benefit.49  The majority of workers of color do not benefit 
from this tax break.50  The reasons are varied.51  First, less than half of black 
and Asian-American workers and less than one-third of Latino workers have 
jobs that come with this benefit.52  Second, of the workers of color that have 
jobs that come with this perk, an even smaller group participates.53 
Just over four in ten white workers participated in their employer- or 
union-provided pension plan.54  Thus, the majority of white workers also do 
not benefit from this tax break.55  Just over half of white workers have jobs 
that come with pensions, but just over 40% actually participate.56 
Given that most taxpayers, regardless of race, do not benefit from this 
tax break,57 the exclusion should be repealed and wages should be taxed 
currently.  Investment income could be taxed at retirement in a way similar 
to the tax treatment of annuities—where every payment would include a 
 46.  See infra Part V. 
47.  I have previously written on this subject.  See Brown, Risk Aversion, supra note 8. 
 48.  See I.R.S., PUB. 575, PENSION AND ANNUITY INCOME 4–5 (2012), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p575.pdf. 
49.  Copeland, supra note 20, at 11. 
 50.  Id. at 8–11. 
51. See Brown, Risk Aversion, supra note 8, at 404–05. 
52.  Copeland, supra note 20, at 11.
53. Id.
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. 
56. Id.
 57.  Id. at 8–9. 
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return of capital representing wages that were previously taxed (and not 
taxed again) and the investment income portion which would be taxed at 
retirement for the first time.58  Simpson–Bowles, which only suggests 
minimal changes to non-employer-provided pensions,59 does not go far 
enough.  Current taxation of employer-provided pensions would be a first 
step toward a major tax rate reduction for middle- and low-income 
taxpayers. 
III.  RATE CHOICES 
One of the biggest loopholes in current law is the result of a 
congressional choice to tax income from wages at a much higher rate than 
income from stock ownership.60  That choice is also responsible for much of 
the complexity in our tax system.61  Income from stock includes not only 
gains from sale, but also dividends that are currently taxed at the preferential 
rate.62  It is that rate differential (at least fifteen percentage points) that is 
responsible for Warren Buffett (who gets most of his income from stock) 
paying taxes at a lower rate than his secretary (who gets most of her income 
from wages.)63 
In 2010, fewer than one in ten non-white or Hispanic families held stock 
in a way that made them eligible for the low preferential rate.64  Fewer than 
two in ten white families owned stock in a way that made them eligible for 
the preferential rate.65  Most families do not take advantage of this 
loophole.66 
In 2012, just over 70% of all capital gains went to the top 1% of 
taxpayers.67  But not all one percenters are beneficiaries of this tax break.68  
58. Cf. 26 U.S.C.A. § 72 (West 2012). 
 59.  See SIMPSON & BOWLES, supra note 11, at 31 n.6.  No changes were made to the tax 
treatment of employer-provided pensions.  Id. 
60.  The lower preferential rate is applicable to gains from the sale or exchange of any capital 
asset as defined in § 1221.  26 U.S.C.A. § 1221 (West 2012).  Stock is a common example of the 
type of capital gains that individual taxpayers have.  See, e.g., Kelly Phillips Erb, Income Taxes on 
Capital Gain, DAILY FINANCE (Jan. 21, 2010, 2:00 PM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2010/01/21/ 
income-taxes-on-capital-gains/.
61. Tax Reform and the Tax Treatment of Capital Gains: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways 
& Means and the S. Comm. on Fin., 112th Cong. 6 (2012) (statement of Leonard E. Burman, 
Professor of Public Affairs, Syracuse University). 
62.  Qualified dividends are subject to tax at the preferential rate. 26 U.S.C.A. § 1(h)(11)(B)(ii) 
(West 2012). 
 63.  Tienabeso, supra note 5.  Warren’s secretary, Debbie Bosanek, reportedly pays 35.8% of 
income as taxes; Warren pays only 17.4% of income as taxes.  Id. 
64.  Bricker et al., supra note 26, at 29.
65. Id.
 66.  Id. 
67.  Huang & Marr, supra note 29, at 2 (“Capital gains are heavily concentrated at the top; the 
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Every high-income taxpayer will not benefit simply because they have high 
income.  They will only benefit if they receive a significant amount of their 
income from stock and not wages.  Not every high-income family receives 
significant income from stock.69  One famous high-income couple that does 
not receive significant income from stock is President and Mrs. Obama.70 
An examination of the last five years worth of tax returns shows how 
little income from stock the Obamas receive.71  They are very different from 
other one percenters.72  Focusing on three of those years, 2007-2009, the 
First Couple’s effective tax rate was almost 10% higher than comparable 
income households.73  That difference is attributable to the fact that the 
Obamas, like most blacks, do not own much stock, while stock ownership is 
more prevalent amongst whites with comparable income.74  While wage 
income and book royalties (how the Obamas have earned their millions75) 
are taxed at progressive rates up to 39.6% of income, income from stock is 
taxed at a maximum 23.8% rate.76 
According to IRS statistics, most one percenters with at least $1.5 
million of household income receive 30% of that income from stock.77  In 
top 1 percent of taxpayers will receive 71 percent of all capital gains in 2012 . . . .”). 
 68.  See G. William Domhoff, Wealth, Income, and Power, U.C. SANTA CRUZ, at tbl. 6b, 
http://www2.ucsc.edu/whorulesamerica/power/wealth.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2013). 
 69.  See id. 
 70.  See President Obama and Vice President Biden: 12 Years of Tax Returns, ORGANIZING FOR 
ACTION, http://www.barackobama.com/tax-returns/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2013) (showing President 
Obama’s tax returns from years 2000 to 2011). 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  See Domhoff, supra note 68. 
73.  The Obamas’ 2007 tax return: (Total Tax/AGI) $1,396,772/$4,139,965 = 33.7%; 2008 tax 
return: $855,323/$2,656,902 = 32.19%; 2009 tax return: $1,792,414/$5,505,409 = 32.56%. See
supra note 70.  Compare with the analysis provided by Martin Sullivan, infra note 77: 23.9% for 
households with AGI between two and five million dollars and 22.8% for households with AGI 
between five and ten million dollars. 
 74.  See supra notes 70–73 and accompanying text. 
 75.  See Obama Worth Millions, Mainly Due to Book Royalties, REUTERS (May 16, 2011, 4:34 
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/16/us-obama-wealth-idUSTRE74F6UR20110516. 
76.  Tony Nitti, Capital Gains and the Fiscal Cliff Deal: How Does It Work?, FORBES, Jan. 4, 
2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/anthonynitti/2013/01/04/capital-gains-and-the-fiscal-cliff-deal-
how-does-it-work/.  This is calculated by the 20% rate on high-income taxpayers plus the 3.8% tax 
on net investment income.  Ashlea Ebeling, Tax Hikes Hit Trusts Hard, Beneficiaries Pull Money 
Out, FORBES, Jan. 9, 2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/ashleaebeling/2013/01/09/tax-hikes-hit-
trusts-hard-beneficiaries-pull-money-out/. During the tax years at issue for the Obama tax returns, 
the differential was between 35% as the highest marginal tax rate on royalty income and wages 
compared with a 15% tax rate on income from stocks. 
77.  Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: Is the Income Tax Really Progressive?, 125 TAX
NOTES 1135, 1135–36 (2009), available at http://www.taxanalysts.com/www/features.nsf/Article 
02 BROWN SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/16/13  9:06 AM 
 
1164 
households between $2 and $5 million of income, one percenters receive 
36% of income from stock.78  Taxpayers with between $5 and $10 million of 
income receive 45% from stock.79  As Martin Sullivan has shown through 
his analysis of IRS statistics, once income exceeds roughly $1.5 million, 
effective tax rates decline because so much of household income comes 
from income from stock.80  Thus, for the highest income taxpayers, ours is a 
regressive tax system.  Not true for the Obamas, however.  In each year that 
the Obamas had comparable income levels, they received less than one 
percent of their income from stock.81 
The First Family’s experience is consistent with numerous studies 
showing that whites have higher stock ownership than blacks, Latinos, and 
other people of color, even after controlling for income.82  High income 
alone will not solve the black–white gap in stock ownership. 
The reasons for the lack of stock ownership by blacks are complicated.83  
First, blacks are less likely to grow up in households where investing in the 
stock market is common practice.84  Second, middle-income blacks are less 
likely to own stocks than middle-income whites.85  Middle-income blacks 
are more likely than middle-income whites to assist family members 
financially.86  Third, stocks are risky investments.87 
Supporters of the preferential rate generally make several arguments in 
support of a lower tax rate on income from stock than income from wages.  
First, it has been this way for a very long time and to change the tax 
treatment would be disruptive to the stock market in this fragile economy.88  
s/C214B4EF383FC6C08525768C00615578?OpenDocument.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1135.
 81.  See supra notes 70–73. 
82.  A 2007 study found that whites had higher stock ownership than blacks, Latinos, and other 
people of color, even after controlling for income, risk tolerance, and business ownership, among 
other things.  Sherman D. Hanna, Cong Wang & Yoonkyung Yuh, Racial/Ethnic Differences in 
High Return Investment Ownership: A Decomposition Analysis, 21 J. FIN. COUNSELING &
PLANNING 44, 44 (2010), available at http://6aa7f5c4a9901a3e1a1682793cd11f5a6b732d29.
gripelements.com/pdf/vol_21_issue_2_hanna_wang_yuh.pdf.
83.  Brown, Risk Aversion, supra note 8; Dorothy A. Brown, How Home Ownership Keeps 
Blacks Poorer than Whites, FORBEs, Dec. 10, 2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesleadership 
forum/2012/12/10/how-home-ownership-keeps-blacks-poorer-than-whites/ [hereinafter Brown, 
Home Ownership].
 84.  Brown, Home Ownership, supra note 83.  
85.  N.S. Chiteji & Darrick Hamilton, Family Connections and the Black–White Wealth Gap 
Among Middle-Class Families, 30 REV. BLACK POL. ECON. 9, 16 (2002) (“Among middle-class 
families, the proportion of white families that own stock is more than twice as high as the proportion 
of similarly situated black families—about 35 percent compared to 13 percent.”). 
 86.  Brown, Home Ownership, supra note 83. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  David John Marotta, Capital Gains Tax is an Economic Monkey Wrench (2012), FORBES, 
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Second, if tax rates on income from stock were raised, people would hold 
onto their stocks and delay selling for fear of paying higher taxes.89  This is 
referred to as the lock-in effect.  Third, some even argue that the preferential 
rate is too high and should be cut even further.  The rate cut would increase 
government revenues because people would be encouraged to sell their 
stock.90 
Fourth, stocks held over a long period of time increase in value in part 
because of inflation, and some argue that it is not fair to tax that part of a 
capital gain that is attributable to inflation at a high rate.  The lower rate 
takes into account the inflation aspect.  A related point is that selling stocks 
during the year pushes a taxpayer into a higher marginal tax bracket in the 
year of sale, which is unfair because the income accrued over several years. 
A separate rate system is a better solution.91 
Fifth, corporate dividends should be taxed at a reduced rate, because it 
represents the corporation distributing its earnings after paying tax on it.  It 
is unfair, the argument goes, to tax a shareholder again on corporate earnings 
that have previously been taxed.  None of these reasons, however, hold up 
under scrutiny. 
First, it wasn’t too long ago, 1986 to be precise, that wages and income 
from stock were taxed at the same rate.92  It was part of a bipartisan tax 
reform effort led by President Ronald Reagan.93  The tax rate that applied to 
capital gains was raised, and the tax rates that applied to wage income (and 
dividends) were lowered.94  The bad news is that within the space of a few 
years, the preferential rate returned.95  Still, the point not to lose sight of is 
that there was a time—relatively recently—when capital gains were taxed at 
Nov. 26, 2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/davidmarotta/2012/11/26/capital-gains-tax-is-an-
economic-monkey-wrench-2012/ (“[T]axation discourages financial activity.  The harm will show 
up in lower gross domestic product growth.  It will be reflected in a lack of hiring and expansion.”). 
 89.  Id. (“Your best bet might be simply to sit tight and forgo realizing any capital gains.”). 
90. Id.
 91.  See id. 
 92.  See David Carris, Capital Gains Taxation: A Full Circle?, 14 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 43, 50 
(1989) (“The Tax Reform Act of 1986 makes for the largest capital gains rate increase ever.  Under 
the Act, the taxation of long-term capital gains is the same as ordinary income.”). 
 93.  For a description of President Reagan’s role in the 1986 Tax Reform Act, see Michael Fitts 
& Robert Inman, Controlling Congress: Presidential Influence in Domestic Fiscal Policy, 80 GEO 
L.J. 1737 (1992). 
 94.  Carris, supra note 92, at 50. 
 95.  Bruce Bartlett, TRA 1986: Much Ado About Nothing?, 133 TAX NOTES 359, 360 (2011) 
(“When the top income tax rate was increased to 31 percent in 1990, the rate on capital gains was 
kept at 28 percent, thus reintroducing a preference that was widened in 1993 when the top income 
tax rate rose to 39.6 percent while the capital gains rate stayed at 28 percent.”). 
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the same rate as wage income, and the world as we know it did not come to 
an end.96  Further, for our entire history before the Bush Tax Cuts of 2003, 
corporate dividends were taxed at the same rate as wages.97  The outlier is 
taxing dividend income at the low preferential rate. 
Second, the lock-in effect argument holds less weight given our history 
after the Tax Reform Act of 1986.  Also, for most of the twentieth century, 
tax rates on capital gains were higher than the low of 15%, and the markets 
still functioned effectively.98 
Third, tax rate increases can be accompanied by an increase in 
government revenues.  According to the Center for Budget and Policy 
Priorities, in 1981, when tax rates on high-income taxpayers were cut, and in 
1990 and 1993, when taxes on high-income taxpayers were increased, the 
economy grew at about the same rate (adjusted for inflation and population 
growth), but revenues grew about twice as fast in the 1990s, when tax rates 
were raised, as in the 1980s, when tax rates were lowered.99  
Fourth, the inflation argument falls flat.  In order to benefit from the 
preferential rate, you have to hold the stock for one year and one day.100  
That is not very long.  (Historically, the period that you have to hold stock 
has been as low as six months.101)  In this economy, there is very little 
inflation to worry about.102  Further, why carve out an “inflation exception” 
for income from stock?  Why not have an “inflation exception” for income 
from services?  For an obvious example, let’s return to President Obama. 
He received income from book sales based on services that he 
performed many years ago when he actually wrote the books.103  Those 
services were used to create a book.  It is analogous to receiving income 
today from stock he bought years earlier but did not sell until now.  
Unfortunately, the President’s book royalties cannot be considered a capital 
asset eligible for the lower preferential rate, because his services were used 
to create the book.104  Those who argue for a low tax rate on income from 
96. Id. at 359–61.
 97.  See Floyd Norris, Tax Reform Might Start with a Look Back to ‘86, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/23/business/a-starting-point-for-tax-reform-what-reagan-did 
.html?smid=pl-share. 
 98.  See supra notes 92–98 and accompanying text. 
99.  Paul Krugman, Reagan and Revenues, N.Y. TIMES BLOG (June 22, 2011 3:12 AM), 
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/22/reagan-and-revenues/. 
 100.  I.R.S., Tax Topic 409: Capital Gains and Losses, http://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc409.html 
(last visited Mar. 28, 2013). 
 101.  Gerald E. Auten, Capital Gains Taxation, TAX POL’Y CENTER, http://www.taxpolicycenter. 
org/taxtopics/encyclopedia/Capital-Gains-Taxation.cfm (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
 102.  See Consumer Price Index, BUREAU LAB. STAT., http://www.bls.gov/cpi/ (last visited Apr. 
1, 2013). 
 103.  See supra notes 70–73 and accompanying text. 
104.  26 U.S.C.A. § 1221(a)(3)(A) (West 2012). 
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stock never argue that income like royalties should be subject to tax at a 
lower rate because of it.  There should be no “inflation exception” for any 
type of income. 
Fifth, the assumption that it would be unfair to tax corporate earnings at 
the higher progressive rate because they have already been taxed once at the 
corporate level ignores reality.  According to a 2008 report by the GAO, 
two-thirds of corporations doing business in the U.S. paid no taxes between 
1998 and 2005.105  Corporations do the same thing individuals do—they look 
for deductions and any thing they can think of to lower their tax bill.106  The 
“double tax” therefore only affects a minority of corporations and their 
shareholders. 
Simpson–Bowles demonstrates that the key to getting the lowest 
marginal tax rates requires repealing the preferential rates that apply to 
income from stock.107  For example, the highest marginal tax rate could be as 
low as 23%.108  If the earned income tax credit was retained, something that I 
advocate, the tax rate could be as low as 24%.109  Since my proposal is to 
broaden the taxable income base even more than Simpson–Bowles, one 
could expect the top rate to be reduced even further.  Currently it is 39.6%, 
although Simpson–Bowles was operating at a top marginal tax rate of 
35%.110 
Finally, tax preferences for capital gains and dividends have been 
argued to be “the largest contributor to the increase in the overall income 
inequality.”111  Tax law should not be a factor in increasing income 
inequality.  Since most Americans do not benefit from this special rate, it 
should be repealed.112  All income should be taxed at the same rates.  The 
Internal Revenue Code would be fairer and simpler even if this were the 
only change enacted. 
105.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-957, COMPARISON OF THE REPORTED TAX
LIABILITIES OF FOREIGN- AND U.S.-CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS, 1998–2005 23 (2008), available
at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08957.pdf.
 106.  See, e.g., Michael Doran, Managers, Shareholders, and the Corporate Double Tax, 95 VA. 
L. REV. 517, 537–38 (2009) (summarizing some of the many corporate deductions available). 
 107.  SIMPSON & BOWLES, supra note 11, at 31. 
108. Id. at 29.  This would include an elimination of the earned income tax credit, which I would 
not support. 
109. Id.
 110.  Id. 
111.  Huang & Marr, supra note 29, at 2–3 (quoting THOMAS L. HUNGERFORD, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R42131, CHANGES IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME AMONG TAX FILERS BETWEEN 1996
AND 2006: THE ROLE OF LABOR INCOME, CAPITAL INCOME, AND TAX POLICY 1 (2011)). 
 112.  Id. at 7. 
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IV.  DEDUCTION CHOICES 
Congress makes choices about whether the money taxpayers spend 
makes them eligible for a tax deduction.113  Deductions in a progressive rate 
system do not benefit taxpayers equally.114  The value of tax deductions 
becomes a function of how high a taxpayer’s income is.115  Higher income 
taxpayers receive more value from tax deductions than lower income 
taxpayers and have more of an incentive to “find” tax deductions.116  This is 
not an unforeseen consequence.117  This is how the progressive rate system is 
designed to work.118  Middle and upper income taxpayers generally benefit 
from tax deductions much more than lower income taxpayers.119 
This Part focuses on the deduction for mortgage interest on a home.120  
Current law allows a deduction for mortgage interest on up to two homes 
provided the mortgages do not exceed $1 million and a home equity loan 
does not exceed $100,000.121 
When it comes to home ownership, higher income taxpayers are the 
ones most likely to own homes.122  This makes sense, as higher income 
taxpayers can better afford to own.  But it skews those eligible to receive this 
particular tax subsidy.  Here Congress chose to tie a deduction to an asset 
that is more likely to be found in higher-income households.  High-income 
taxpayers are the most likely to own homes and receive the benefit of tax 
subsidies.123 
Economists generally believe that the mortgage interest deduction does 
virtually nothing to encourage people to buy homes.124  Over the last forty 
years, while tax rates have changed dramatically (making the value of the 
tax benefits fluctuate), the home-ownership rate has been quite stable.125  
 113.  See Dorothy Brown, Let’s Kill the Progressive Tax Rate System, supra note 10. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  See Joseph J. Thorndike, Americans Don’t Mind Taxes—They Hate Tax Loopholes, WASH. 
POST, Sept. 12, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/10/AR201 
0091002680.html. 
 119.  See Dorothy Brown, Let’s Kill the Progressive Tax Rate System, supra note 10. 
120.  This Part draws heavily on my prior work in this area.  See Brown, Shades, supra note 8. 
121.  26 U.S.C.A. § 163(h) (West 2012). 
122. A Profile of the High-Income Taxpayers in the Middle of the Tax Cut Debate, TAX FOUND.
(Sept. 22, 2010), http://taxfoundation.org/article/profile-high-income-taxpayers-middle-tax-cut-
debate.
 123.  Id. 
124.  Brown, Shades, supra note 8, at 333. 
 125.  William G. Gale, Jonathan Gruber & Seth Stephens-Davidowitz, Encouraging 
Homeownership Through the Tax Code, 115 TAX NOTES 1171, 1172 (2007), available at 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/1001084_Encouraging_Homeownership.pdf. 
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The biggest increase in home-ownership rates came after World War II and 
was the result of innovations in mortgage financing—not the tax subsidies 
which were there all along.126  That does not mean that homeowners are not 
aware of the tax break when they buy a house.  It means that they do not 
decide to buy a house because of the tax break.  The research generally 
shows that the tax deduction simply rewards behavior (buying a home) that 
was going to occur anyway.127 
The majority of blacks and Latinos are renters and do not pay any 
mortgage interest.128  They are thus ineligible to receive this benefit.  While 
the majority of whites and Asian-Americans own homes (and overall 
roughly two-thirds of Americans do), of the 143 million tax returns filed in 
2007, only 29% of all taxpayers claimed the mortgage interest deduction as 
one of their itemized deductions.129  Simpson–Bowles argues for changing 
the deduction into a credit, limiting the maximum mortgage outstanding to 
$500,000, and only making it available for one home.130  This would 
certainly make the deduction more equitable; however, it does not go far 
enough.  Because most taxpayers do not benefit from this deduction, repeal 
is the better option. 
In the past, I have been reluctant to argue for the repeal of tax subsidies 
for housing because of the significant percentage of wealth that taxpayers of 
color have tied up in their homes.131  Repeal would likely lead to some 
decrease in home values given that the mortgage interest deduction is priced 
into the value of our homes.132  The amount of the decrease is subject to 
much speculation.133  Nevertheless, repeal of the mortgage interest deduction 
would not hurt the majority of black and Latino families who do not own 
 126.  Id. at 1171. 
 127.  Id. at 1179–80. 
 128.  Id. at 1172. 
 129.  MARK P. KEIGHTLEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41596, THE MORTGAGE INTEREST AND 
PROPERTY TAX DEDUCTIONS: ANALYSIS AND OPTIONS 5 (2011), available at 
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R41596_20110118.pdf. 
 130.  SIMPSON & BOWLES, supra note 11, at 31. 
131.  Brown, Shades, supra note 8, at 341. 
132. Id. at 374. 
133. Id. at 377; see also Stan Humphries, Mortgage Interest Tax Deduction Isn’t the Best Way to 
Help Housing, FORBES, Sept. 27, 2011, http://www.forbes.com/sites/zillow/2011/09/27/stimulating-
homeownership-the-great-debate/ (“The debate over the [mortgage interest] deduction rears its head 
every few years, and again this year, we’re getting ready to spend a lot of light and heat debating the 
issue.”); Mark Koba, End the Mortgage Interest Deduction? Expect a Fight, CNBC, Feb. 28, 2013, 
http://www.cnbc.com/id/100506426.
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homes.  Finally, lower housing prices may encourage first-time home buyers 
to enter the market. 
V.  THE WAY FORWARD: THE 535 REPORT 
As I have shown, the majority of taxpayers are penalized by the current 
tax system.134  The bipartisan Simpson–Bowles plan provides a way out, yet 
it has languished since the report came out in December 2010.  Simpson–
Bowles has not been embraced by the public or by members of Congress.135  
One potential explanation for why the members of Congress have not 
embraced Simpson–Bowles is because they are beholden to the wealthiest 
Americans who fund their campaigns, and Simpson–Bowles-type reform is 
against their financial interests.136  However, I propose a different 
explanation.  Congress is not embracing Simpson–Bowles because, while it 
would be bad for the richest Americans, it would also be bad for Congress.  
Two-thirds of Senators are wealthy.137  The median net worth of the 
members of Congress is just over $750,000.138 
What is needed to enable the public to get engaged in the tax reform 
debate is what political scientists call a “focusing event.”  Professor Thomas 
A. Birkland defines a focusing event as “an event that is sudden; relatively 
uncommon; can be reasonably defined as harmful or revealing the 
possibility of potentially greater future harms; has harms that are 
concentrated in a particular geographical area or community of interest; and 
that is known to policy makers and the public simultaneously.”139 
The 535 Report could be that focusing event.  The 535 Report would be 
“sudden” and “uncommon” because it has never been done before.  My 
hunch is that the 535 Report would show that current tax laws are “harmful” 
to most Americans because they are not eligible for most of the tax breaks, 
 134.  See supra Part III. 
 135.  See, e.g., Donald Haider, Simpson-Bowles: It’s Back, and Better than Ever, BLOOMBERG, 
June 14, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-14/in-praise-still-and-again-of-simpson-
bowles.html. On March 28, 2012, the House rejected a Simpson-Bowles type plan in a vote of 382-
38. See Ezra Klein, House Reaches Bipartisan Deal to Reject Simpson-Bowles, WASH. POST (Mar. 
29, 2012) at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/post/wonkbook-house-reaches-
bipartisan-deal-to-reject-simpson-bowles/2012/03/29/gIQAfucdiS_blog.html. 
136. See generally Overton, supra note 41.
137.  Catherine Rampell, Your Senator Is (Probably) a Millionaire, N.Y. TIMES BLOG (Nov. 25, 
2009, 2:42 PM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/11/25/your-senator-is-probably-a-
millionaire/.
 138.  Net Worth, 2011, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/pfds/overview.php (last 
visited Feb. 25, 2013).  There are more Democratic millionaires in the Senate (36) than Republican 
millionaires (30).  Id. 
139.  Thomas A. Birkland, Focusing Events, Mobilization, and Agenda Setting, 18 J PUB. POL’Y,
53, 54 (1998); see also THOMAS A. BIRKLAND, AFTER DISASTER: AGENDA SETTING, PUBLIC
POLICY, AND FOCUSING EVENTS (1997); KINGDON, supra note 43. 
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but beneficial to members of Congress who are eligible.  The 535 Report, 
once issued, would be known to policy makers and the public at the same 
time. 
There is some precedent for this type of report.  Currently, the IRS 
annually issues a report on the tax returns of the top 400 highest income 
individuals (the 400 Report).140  Without disclosing names, the 400 Report 
analyzes the percent of household income from wages as well as capital 
gains and dividend income.141  It looks at the extent to which those taxpayers 
benefit from deductions such as interest and charitable contributions.142  As a 
result, we learn what type of income the highest income households receive 
and the frequency with which they take certain deductions.143 
In June of 2003, David Cay Johnston reported in the New York Times 
that the 400 Report was issued at the urging of Professor Joel Slemrod, who 
then served on an IRS advisory panel.144  The report itself provides: “The 
Statistics of Income (SOI) Division announces a new statistical report in 
response to requests to provide data on the 400 individual income tax 
returns reporting the highest adjusted gross income (AGI) in each tax 
year . . . .”145  No law was required.  Thus, there should be no legal 
impediment to the 535 Report being issued by the IRS. 
Currently, members of Congress are not required to disclose their tax 
returns and very few do.146  The 535 Report I propose would provide a study 
of the 100 senators and 435 members of the House of Representatives.  Such 
a study would be less intrusive of privacy rights than a public release 
requirement for every member’s tax returns, although a public release would 
be my preference.147  The 535 Report should include, at a minimum, an 
analysis of the percent of members of Congress who take advantage of the 
largest tax expenditures and a comparison of the congressional percentages 
with those of all taxpayers.148  The tax expenditures studied should include: 
140.  I.R.S. Statistics of Income Bull. Pub. 1136, The 400 Individual Income Tax Returns 
Reporting the Highest Adjusted Gross Incomes Each Year, 1992-2000 (Spring 2003), available at
http://www.irs.gov/file_source/pub/irs-soi/00in400h.pdf [hereinafter 400 REPORT].
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Id. 
144.  David Cay Johnston, Very Richest’s Share of Income Grew Even Bigger, Data Show, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 26, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/26/business/very-richest-s-share-of-
income-grew-even-bigger-data-show.html.
145.  400 REPORT, supra note 140. 
146. See Condon, supra note 13. 
147. See generally J. COMM. ON TAX’N, supra note 18. 
148.  Dorothy A. Brown, Harry Reid Has a Glass-House Quandary on Taxes, BLOOMBERG, Sept. 
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exclusion for employer-provided pensions exclusion for employer paid 
medical insurance premiums, preferential treatment for capital gains and 
dividends, deductions for mortgage interest, charitable contributions, state 
and local taxes, child tax credit, and the earned income tax credit.  The 
percent of Congress that takes advantage of each expenditure should be 
compared with the experiences of all taxpayers in the areas studied. 
My hunch is that the 535 Report would show the harm to the average 
American, in the form of higher tax rates, that was inflicted by Congress in 
exchange for tax breaks that most members of Congress receive but most 
Americans do not.  I have one example to support this hunch.  I recently 
performed a back-of-the-envelope analysis of Senate financial disclosure 
forms.  I wanted to see the number of Senators who owned stock compared 
to the 20% of all families who own stock in a way that makes them eligible 
for the preferential tax rate.149  I looked at every financial disclosure form for 
each Senator to check for stock ownership and tried not to count stock held 
in retirement accounts.  When it wasn’t clear, I counted it as being held by 
the retirement account.  My very rough and conservative calculation showed 
that just under 90% of senators owned stock in a way that made them 
eligible for the low preferential rate.  If the 535 Report were to show similar 
results for tax expenditures, I could imagine a very focused and angry 
electorate, which might persuade a reluctant Congress to enact reform. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Most Americans do not benefit from the special breaks, loopholes, and 
deductions that Congress has passed.  That is true of whites and especially 
true of taxpayers of color.  Once the results of the 535 Report are released, 
the American public will be able to begin to understand the depths of the 
problem and the herculean effort it will take on their part to get Congress to 
change course.  The 535 Report findings should provide that focusing event.  
The recent presidential election, which saw a successful private equity 
manager lose, demonstrated that money cannot buy everything.  Twenty-first 
century tax reform is still possible. 
 
16, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-16/harry-reid-has-a-glass-house-quandary-on-
taxes.html. 
 149.  See Bricker et al., supra note 26, at 30. 
